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Abstract
Attacks on cryptographic systems are limited by the available computa-
tional resources. A theoretical understanding of these resource limitations
is needed to evaluate the security of cryptographic primitives and proce-
dures. This study uses an Attacker versus Environment game formalism
based on computability logic to quantify Shannon’s work function and
evaluate resource use in cryptanalysis. A simple cost function is defined
which allows to quantify a wide range of theoretical and real computa-
tional resources. With this approach the use of custom hardware, e.g.,
FPGA boards, in cryptanalysis can be analyzed. Applied to real cryptan-
alytic problems, it raises, for instance, the expectation that the computer
time needed to break some simple 90 bit strong cryptographic primitives
might theoretically be less than two years.
keywords: computation, cryptanalysis, computational complexity
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1 Introduction
There have been many examples where the ongoing increase in computer speed
and capacities have made previously secure cryptographic systems vulnerable to
brute force attacks. This perpetual weakening of cryptographic systems due to
the progress in computer hardware has been incorporated in rules of application.
For instance, NIST in the USA publishes elaborate rules about the phasing
out of shorter (weaker) keys and algorithms over time [30, 1]. However, those
rules seem not to be based on a theoretical understanding of the availability of
computational resources, but more on a historical trend in technical progress
(e.g., Moore’s law [35]).
It is still difficult to reliably estimate the computational efforts needed to
compromise a cryptographic system, i.e., Shannon’s cryptanalysis work func-
tion [31]. Many studies and applications go for ultimate security by aiming
for 2k operations, with k ≥ 128, to put brute force attacks out of reach for
the foreseeable future. Others use general purpose, off-the-shelf, computers as
benchmarks. Both approaches have limitations. Long keys imply costly hard-
ware and long computations and often do not describe real life use, e.g., cost
optimization for time-limited secrets. On the other hand, general purpose office
and home computers are not necessarily very efficient for breaking codes and
will almost certainly underestimate contemporary hardware capabilities [39].
The error to think that an off-the-shelf general purpose CPU for an office
computer is an efficient device to recover cryptographic keys and passwords or
break cryptographic codes, is a common one. Expressions like Calculating X took
Y hours on a Z-level computer are very often encountered. As a result, there
seems to be general surprise every time it is shown that low-cost, specialized
processors can outperform general office CPUs. For example, even though the
idea might not have been new [4], there was again alarm in the media when
in 2007 a Russian software company, Elcomsoft, filed for a US patent for a
technique to use low cost standard graphics cards to recover passwords [12].
Although the problem mentioned above is more generally seen in complex-
ity and game theoretical analysis, it’s practical importance is most acute for
cryptanalysis and digital security. Many security policies rely on cryptographic
systems as a crucial element. The difficulty with studying vulnerabilities in
cryptography is their theoretical status. The most interesting vulnerabilities
in cryptographic systems are generally untested and the cost of a theoretically
possible attack is therefore very difficult to estimate. Even though there is a
good mathematical understanding of how cryptographic systems can be com-
promised, there is no consensus about a formalism in which the resources needed
can be formally described and quantified.
This study uses a general formalism for quantifying computational resources
which was proposed in [39]. This formalism defines resource use both on a
symbolic level and on real hardware. The relevant parts of the model will be
repeated here to make the current study self contained. The model will then be
tailored to quantifying the cryptanalysis work function of Shannon [31] which
aligns very closely to problems in game theory, e.g., the computational Nash
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equilibrium [10, 11], and algorithmic complexity theory with space and time
bounded automata [5].
Section 2 presents a summary of the model from [39] adapted to cryptanal-
ysis. The use of the model will be illustrated on existing hardware products.
In section 3, the model is applied to some examples from the cryptanalysis
literature. The results are discussed in section 4.
2 Cryptanalytic attacks as games
Cryptanalytic attacks are interactive procedures where a cryptographic system
is attacked using computational resources to compromise protected informa-
tion. It is assumed that the attacker can only use algorithmic procedures and
computers. Such an attack can be emulated as a game by a collection of Tur-
ing Complete devices [31, 40]. For their mathematical convenience, Universal
Turing Machines (UTM) will be used to illustrate the formalism [36], but the
results hold for all such devices. Cryptanalytical attacks are problems of com-
putability. This model of cryptanalytic attacks fits the theoretic framework of
computability logic [13, 14, 15, 16].
In computability logic, computability is defined in terms of games. The
“computer”, or Attacker, plays against the Environment and “wins” if it can
complete the requested computation successfully. Computability logic tries to
be a complete logic of interactive computing. This study only refers to some
general aspects of computability logic. The reader can consult Japaridze [15, 16]
and the references therein for extensive descriptions of the theory.
In short, the Attacker can play a game against the Environment on one or
more “boards”, in parallel. This study will restrict itself to a Hard Play model
of deterministic static games [15]. That is, only purely algorithmic and repro-
ducible games are considered where the speed of the moves is not relevant. The
environment can execute any number of moves for any single computational step
of the System. In practice, these two conditions, a Hard Play model and static
games, do not restrict the Attacker. They just prescribe that any attack strategy
should involve a number of algorithmic steps and that the Environment, which
includes the complete universe, has unlimited capacities for executing counter
strategies. This model can be extended to include probabilistic strategies. In
this framework, it is rather straightforward to set up a model for a cryptanalytic
attack (c.f., [40, 31]).
2.1 The Attacker model
In the framework of computability logic, the Attacker is a collection of UTMs,
each with three tapes: a work tape, a valuation tape, and a run tape. The
valuation tape is supposed to contain the game specific parameters supplied by
the Environment, whereas the work tape will be initialized with a program to
load and play games from the valuation tape. A more general interpretation of
4
the valuation tape is that it contains any public information outside the control
of the Attacker (for a more extensive description see [39]).
The run tape contains the moves of the Attacker and the Environment.
In the current framework, both the Attacker and the Environment write their
moves onto the run tape. The alphabet used on the run tape is prescribed by
the Environment. The Attacker can only move the reading head forward on the
run tape and visit each cell only once. The Environment is free to read the run
tape in any direction as often as it wants, but can only write to empty cells.
To allow the “access once” restriction, all moves are written as self delimited or
fixed length strings onto the run tape.
Scanning the run tape for moves of the Environment is a computational
cost that must be born by the Attacker. To minimize that cost, the moments at
which the Environment can write to a run tape are restricted. The Environment
will only write to a run tape in response to a move of the Attacker. After the
Attacker has written a move to the run tape, it can enter a “wait” state and go
to sleep. Only then will the Environment write it’s move or moves in a single
self delimited or fixed length string to tape and wake up the Attacker who then
can read the moves and continue. This interpretation of the run-tape embodies
the principle that the Attacker must actively query for information from the
Environment.
The Attacker can recruit as many UTMs as it wants by specifying them on
the run tape from any of the existing UTMs. The communication between the
Attacker UTMs is here modeled by simply letting the work tapes overlap. Other
solutions are possible. Any newly instantiated UTM of the Attacker gets it’s
own run tape and a copy of the valuation tape.
Any request for a new UTM should consist of a full description of the finite
state machine, initial state, contents of the work tape, position of the heads,
and the overlap between work tapes. A new UTM is instantiated with the finite
state machine specified, the valuation and work tapes loaded and the work tape
is stitched up with the correct part of the requesting UTM’s work tape. Then
the UTM is put in the initial state with the heads over the correct tape positions
and started.
The possible moves of the Attacker can be divided into 4 classes:
• General information requests
• Structural requests
• Encryption requests
• Challenges
The meaning of the first is obvious. The second kind are requests to the En-
vironment for new daughter UTMs or changes in the current UTM, e.g., re-
leasing work tape memory. In modeling a realistic attack, structural requests
would (de-)commission computing resources. Encryption requests implement
the gathering of plaintexts and ciphertexts.
5
The cost of defeating a cryptographic system includes actually compromising
it. Challenges are Attacker initiated moves to prove it has won, i.e., succeeded in
compromising the cryptographic system by actually executing and completing
the attack. A challenge could be to supply the current password, but could also
demonstrate the ability to correctly pair cipher- and plaintexts. Note that after
every move of the Attacker, the Environment must make a move, even if it is
just a denial of the request.
This model of an Attacker is able to describe a large number of cryptanalytic
attacks. For instance, distributed attacks, both coordinated or not, known
ciphertext or plaintext attacks, and chosen plaintext attacks. Even attacks
of “security by obscurity” systems could be studied by supplying a stochastic
model of information leakage to the valuation tape.
2.2 Resource needs and cost of computation
One problem with the above computational attack model is that most crypto-
graphic systems can be defeated by simple brute force attacks, e.g., just trying
all possible keys [31] or even simply trying all programs to crack the encryption
(c.f., algorithmic complexity [20]). However, the security of cryptography lies in
the fact that performing computations has costs, and for a brute force attack,
these costs should be too high to be feasible [31]. But to use these costs in a
computational model, they should be made explicit. In the remainder of this
text, the model from [39] will be used to quantify computational costs. The
relevant points will be described here.
A useful cost function for computations should follow some sanity conditions.
The definition should be applicable to both theoretical and real devices. The
costs should be cumulative and additive under appropriate conditions. The
universal nature of computational devices should be mirrored in the existence
of efficient emulation of one device on another one. Here an “efficient emulator”
will be defined as any device that can emulate any computation on the target
device with a cost that is a linear function of the original cost and number of
steps in the computation ([39]).
Starting with a purely theoretical device, a very simple cost function for a
single UTM that agrees with all of the above conditions is
C =
Λ∑
λ=1
IUTM (λ) (1)
Where C is the total cost of the computation which runs over Λ steps. IUTM (λ)
is the information in bits stored in the UTM at step λ. IUTM includes details
about the internal structure of the device, e.g., action tables of a UTM. See [39]
for a discussion and proofs.
The definition of equation 1 can easily be extended to other computational
devices (even neural wet-ware [39]). The only requirement is that the function-
ality of the device can be modeled as a collection of interconnected and modular
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Table 1: Example processor characteristics. Comp.: Parallel programmable
components. #Trans.: Indicative number of transistors. Bytes/s: Resource
size ICPU times cycles/sec from equation 1. Note that transistor counts are
commercially sensitive information which should be interpreted with extreme
care. These numbers will also vary widely between product versions.
Type CPU Comp.a Clocka #Trans.a Bytes / s
GPU ATI Radeon 5870 1712b 850 MHz 2.15·109 18.3·1017
CPU Intel Core Duo 2 cores 2.6 GHz 291·106 7.57·1017
FPGA Xilinx Virtex-5 slicesc
XC5VFX70T-2 11,200 249 MHz 1.1·109 2.74·1017
XC5VLX30-3 4,800 251 MHz 1.1·109 2.76·1017
XC5VFX70T-2 11,200 277 MHz 1.1·109 3.04·1017
a Specifications as published in marketing materials and [44, 45, 3]. b The total number
of stream processors, texture units, and render output units [3]. c The Virtex-5 FPGA is
organized in slices, with each slice containing four 6-input Look-Up-Tables (LUT) and four
flip-flops [27, 46]
logical components, e.g., logical gates, finite state machines, or UTMs. The fac-
tor IUTM in equation 1 will be replaced by a factor IDev which measures the
number of bits needed to identify the chosen device out of all the possible de-
vices (including all non-functional ones) that could have been constructed using
the same basic components, plus the current state of these components.
For instance, the logical functions a modern CPU silicon chip can perform
are limited by the number of transistors it contains. The size of ICPU would
therefore be related to the number of ways the transistors on it can be wired
and how many states they can be in. Note that in this description, no mention
is made of the actual physics of the components. That is, if the same range of
logic functions could be performed using fluid valves or photonic switches, the
same IDev could result.
2.3 Relations with real hardware
The above theory on efficient emulators can be used to derive an estimate of
the computational capabilities of real hardware [39]. As mentioned before, a
CPU chip is characterized by a number of active elements, transistors, and the
connections between them. The whole CPU is run at a certain speed. The
computational cost of running a certain computation on a CPU can therefore
be quantified as the number of steps needed to complete the computation times
the information frozen into the chip design.
This exercise can also be done the other way around. First, the requirements
for performing a basic computation in terms of electronic circuits (i.e.,transistors)
and number of steps are determined. Then, the number of copies of the basic
devices that fit on a silicon chip are determined. After that, the number and
speed of the computations can be estimated, assuming state-of-the-art special
purpose hardware could be used. It will not come as a surprise to arrive at the
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conclusion that custom build electronics can often outperform general purpose
CPUs.
Using the cost function of equation 1 and the device information content,
IDev, can simplify this hardware analysis in many cases. It might obviate a
detailed analysis of the required circuitry and replace it with a less precise but
much more transparent calculation of comparable “complexity”.
To make this analysis, a model is needed of the computational resources
current hardware can deliver. A realistic model should take details of the lim-
itations of chip design into account. In first approximation it is assumed that
the maximal resources delivered by a CPU are proportional to the number of
transistors. For the current study, a very crude model is assumed [39]. For any
given number of transistors on a chip, it is assumed that each transistor can
be in one of two states (1 bit) and topological constraints limit the number of
different ways it can be connected to neighboring transistors to ∼100 (7 bit).
In total, each transistor can thus be described with 1 byte. Table 1 gives these
numbers for a few example processors.
This naive hardware model is illustrated below on some simplified cryptanal-
ysis problems. The focus of the remainder of this section will be on compute-
bound problems. The contribution of the memory components to the computa-
tions will be ignored in the analysis.
2.3.1 Example: The EFF DES cracker
In [39], the example of the EFF cracking the 56-bit single DES system in 1998
[24, 6] is discussed. The challenge was to find the key that could decrypt an
unknown encrypted message. From this example it is possible to get an estimate
of the number of transistors, and costs, needed to implement basic cryptographic
functions. The EFF succeeded in designing a search unit in silicon that could
check a 56 bit DES key in 16 clock cycles [24, 6]. The EFF were able to fit 24
such search units onto a single chip containing around 10,000 transistors and
use the units in parallel.
So a 56-bit DES encryption unit plus comparator needed ∼ 420 transistors
and runs in 16 clock cycles. With an estimated IDev ∼ 8 · #Transistors bit,
this comes down to around 6,700 bytes in equation 1 for checking a single 56-bit
DES encryption+compare (i.e., 8 · 16 · 104/24 bits, c.f., [39]). This translates
to ∼120 byte per bit key length if it is assumed that encryption effort scales
linearly with key length.
For a brute force key attack, the average number of keys that have to be
tested scales with 2k−1 for key length k. For this specific DES attack, the
computational costs, CDES(k), needed to find a key of length k then scale as:
CDES(k) = 120 · k · 2
k−1 (bytes) (2)
This cost will rise for Triple-DES. Probably in the order of tripling of the cost,
e.g., 360 instead of 120 byte per bit key length.
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2.3.2 GPU chips and super-computers
A modern Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) chip, like the ATI HD Radeon 5870,
contains around 2.15 billion transistors and runs at a clock speed of 850 MHz
[3]. Such a processor handles computations at a cost of ∼ 18 · 1017 bytes per
second (table 1). If such a processor could be constructed to run as an efficient
parallel DES key search engine, i.e.,like the EFF custom chips, it would be able
to find a 56 bit DES key in 133 seconds on average.
To illustrate the capabilities of GPUs, the analysis is extended to a hypo-
thetical encryption method with the same features as the single DES encryption
standard, DES∗. This DES∗ system is a model of simple cryptographic prim-
itives and encryptions. The fictional DES∗ differs from real DES in that it
allows variable key lengths. For every key length, an EFF DES cracker setup
can be constructed for this fictional DES∗ that scales like equation 2 and uses
120 byte per bit key length to check a single key.
On a customized processor of this size and speed, finding a 64 bit DES∗ key
would require, on average, around 11 hours, and a 72 bit DES∗ key less than
5 months. A dedicated 65k (216) processor cluster would find an 84 bit DES∗
key in around 10 days and a 92 bit key in around 8 years. A 96 bit DES∗ key
would take such a cluster around 120 years (on average; 240 years worst case).
For finding a 96 bit DES∗ key in less than two years average, the technology
would have to speed up by a factor of 60. At the historical rate of progress of
IDev, around 2.6 dB/year (≈ 1.82/year [39]), this would take another 7 year to
achieve (but see [35]).
For comparison, the fifth highest entry in the November 2009 TOP 500 list of
supercomputers, the Tianhe-1 supercomputer at the National SuperComputer
Center in Tianjin/NUDT, China, contains 4096 Intel Xeon E5540 processors
(2.5GHz, 7.3 · 108 transistors) and 1024 E5450 processors (3GHz, 8.2 · 108 tran-
sistors) connected to 5120 ATI Radeon HD 4870 GPUs (650MHz, 9.6 · 108
transistors) with a grand total of over 98TB of memory [32, 33, 37]. Together
the processors deliver 1.3 · 1022 bytes/sec (ignoring memory). If such a machine
would have been build as a dedicated DES∗ key searcher, it would be able to
find an 84 bit DES∗ key in 87 days, on average. The Tianhe-1 was build for
close to 88 million USD [37].
If the cost of encryption of Triple DES is indeed only ∼3 times that of single
DES, the above numbers are not comforting. Triple DES with 2 independent 56
bit keys (keying option 2) has a listed key strength much less than the expected
112 bits [25, 38]. NIST designates this keying option to have only 80 bits of
security [30] and retires it in 2010. A message encoded with the equivalent of
an 80 bit DES key could theoretically be decrypted within a few days with a
special purpose 65k processor cluster as described above. However, the known
attacks, e.g., [38, 25], are more complex than mere Triple DES encryption,
with important time versus memory trade-off relations. Therefore, a separate
analysis would be needed to calculate the costs of breaking double-key Triple
DES.
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2.3.3 A better fit with FPGA
The preceding sections assumed that an attacker could design and produce large
numbers of special purpose CPU chips with state of the art semi-conductor
technology to compromise cryptographic systems. In many situations, such a
threat model is unrealistic. In such cases, a better model would assume that
the attacker would use existing customizable products. A popular product in
this class is a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), an integrated circuit
designed to be configured by the customer or designer after manufacturing [43].
Large differences in performance between general purpose processors and
specially programmed (FPGA) chips have been demonstrated in the context
of public key block ciphers by Gligoroski et al. [8]. They compared software
implementations on a dual core Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with implementations
on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA chips (table 1).
On an Intel Core Duo dual processor, encrypting a 160 bit block with their
MQQ1 algorithm takes 80,105 cycles and decrypting takes 6,212 cycles (tables
7 and 8 in [8]). Assuming the CPU is running at 2.6GHz, this translates to a
throughput of, respectively, 5.19Mb and 67.0Mb per second. Encryption of a
basic data block (64 bit) with 1024-bit RSA requires 119,800 cycles, decrypt-
ing 2,952,752 cycles on the CPU. Throughputs for RSA are then, respectively,
1.39Mb and 56.4Kb per second.
The same MQQ algorithm had a corresponding throughput for encryption
of 44Gb per second when implemented on four 276.7MHz Xilinx Virtex-5 FP-
GAs and 399Mb per second for decrypting when implemented on a single 249.4
MHz Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. An implementation of 1024-bit RSA on a 251MHz
Virtex-5 FPGA had a throughput of 40Kb per second (unspecified for encryp-
tion or decryption). The computational resources consumed when encrypting
or decrypting a single bit are compared in table 2.
For comparison, results for AES-128 on 16 byte blocks were collected. On an
Intel Core Duo E6700 CPU, the throughput was 1Gbps [26]. Two different im-
plementations on Virtex-5 boards achieved 4.1Gbps throughput [2] (unspecified
Virtex-5 types, assumed to be the same as for the RSA, updating the results,
3.8Gbs, reported in [8]).
Efficient use of hardware is determined by the fit between algorithm and the
logic implemented in the chips. Encrypting with MQQ is amenable to paral-
lelization and fits very well on the Virtex-5 [7]. From table 2 it can be seen that
encryption with MQQ will use ∼5300 times more resources (cycles·transistors,
i.e., bytes) when computed on a general purpose CPU than on a dedicated
FPGA. An increase in hardware efficiency by a factor of ∼5300 would translate
in an additional 12 bits key length that could be decrypted for the same “costs”.
On the other hand, decryption shows only a modest increase in efficiency by a
factor of ∼16.
Another algorithm, 1024-bit RSA, can hardly be parallelized and shows no
real efficiency difference between CPU and FPGA. The AES-128 results are
1There are successful attacks known against MQQ which preclude its use in encryption [7].
This does not affect the computational properties discussed here.
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in between, with a five time increase in efficiency between FPGA and general
purpose CPU (assuming single core use).
The differences between the cases in table 2 raises the question of how the
efficiency gains can be understood. The large gains for the encryption using
the MQQ algorithm implemented on the Virtex-5 FPGA were derived from
the ability to implement the steps of the algorithm in a pipeline that could
output one encrypted data block per clock cycle [7]. Obviously, a tailored par-
allel pipeline approach is not possible with the fixed logic of a general purpose
CPU. As illustrated by table 2, such dramatic increases using FPGAs might be
uncommon.
3 Adversaries on a budget
A really Universal UTM can crack any cryptographic system that is based on
secret information that is less complex than the message. This can be done by
iterating over all programs and select the one that decrypts the message first. In
a secret key based system, it can be done by a brute force attack iterating over
all keys. However, brute force strategies can take more time and matter than
are available in the universe (c.f., [21, 22, 23]). Therefore, a meaningful way is
needed to limit the power of the Attacker without losing the theoretical power of
the UTM. The Attacker needs resources to perform the required computations.
Resources are understood in the sense of [16, 39]. The resources are supplied
by the environment on a request basis.
With a cost function to quantify computational needs in place, meaningful
limits can be placed on the Attacker. A budget is allocated to the Attacker, and
before every step in the computation, the resource costs of that computation step
are subtracted from the budget. If the budget becomes depleted, the Attacker
loses. The size of the smallest budget for which the Attacker can win the
challenges before the budget is depleted can be considered the strength of the
cryptographic system under study. It is obvious that a fully universal UTM is
regained in the limit of an infinite budget.
An intuitively meaningful way to set a budget is to calculate the computa-
Table 2: Computational resources consumed (bytes) when encrypting or de-
crypting 1 bit using the MQQ based algorithm (n=160)[8], 1024-bit RSA [8],
and AES-128 [26, 2]. See table 1 for hardware specifications. The RSA results
for the Virtex-5 combine encryption and decryption. See text for details.
MQQ 1024 RSA AES-128
encryption decryption encryption decryption both
Core Duo 146 GB 11.3 GB 272 GBa 6.71 TBa 379 MB
Virtex-5 27.5 MBb 687 MBc -d 6.9 TBd 67.3 MB
a per core [7]. b four Virtex-5 XC5VFX70T-2 at 277 MHz. c one Virtex-5 XC5VFX70T-
2 at 249 MHz. d one Virtex-5 XC5VLX30-3 at 251 MHz, unspecified combined results for
encryption and decryption were given.
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tional cost of testing all possible keys. So if testing one key costs Ckey , testing
all keys of length k bits will cost Ckey · 2
k, as expected. To assist in book keep-
ing, the Attacker can request the current size of it’s budget on the run tape.
The valuation tape contains the information about the resources available from
the environment. For instance, in situations where the Attacker does not have
to design a computer system from scratch, the valuation tape might contain a
catalogue of available computer systems.
To illustrate the use of the above theory, a few cryptanalytical cases from the
literature are presented. Attention will be focussed on non-interactive cryptanal-
ysis. A full account should also address the interactive gathering of information,
e.g., differential cryptanalysis.
3.1 Challenges: One-Time Pad example
Modeling cryptanalytical attacks as games enforces an explicit definition of the
conditions under which the Attacker wins. The computability logic model de-
scribed here defines winnability as the ability of the Attacker to succeed at a
number of predefined challenges. These challenges can be interactive.
For instance, in most cryptographic systems, the ability to guess whether a
known message has been communicated would be a serious vulnerability. In the
formalism presented here, such knowledge could be formalized as being able to
guess above chance which ciphertext encodes a given plaintext.
As an example, suppose the challenge is to exploit a vulnerability in a One-
Time Pad (OTP) implementation where each plaintext is XORed (eXclusive
OR) with a unique sequence of random bits. The Attacker presents two self
delimited plaintexts on the run tape. The environment answers with a self
delimited ciphertext that encrypts one of these plaintexts. The environment
can pad the shortest plaintext to the length of the longest before encryption.
The Attacker then tells which ciphertext was encrypted. If the Attacker can
guess the correct plaintext above chance, the Attacker wins. The threshold of
proof can be put at any convenient level.
The attack strategy would then be to request encryptions of known or cho-
sen plaintexts. The One-Time pad bit strings are available for analysis after
removing (XOR-ing) the known plaintexts from the ciphertext. If some statis-
tical deviation from a pure, uncorrelated, uniform distribution can be detected
in the bit strings, the challenges can in principle be won. Simply chose the
ciphertext that XORed with the plaintext shows the anomaly.
As the OTP is proven secure [31], the challenges are only winnable if the
(long) keys are not completely random, e.g., when using an insecure Random
Number Generator (RNG). An Attacker model might include a simulation of
compromising a RNG as in, e.g., [9, 17]. By varying the challenges between
ciphertext only, plaintext chosen by Environment, and plaintext chosen by At-
tacker the effects of different security policies can be evaluated. For instance,
the costs and benefits of preventing guessing plaintexts can be compared to
those of periodically reseeding the key generator and redistributing new keys
[17].
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Occasionally, the security of the OTP against cryptanalysis is questioned,
as in [41, 42]. The formalism presented here can help to evaluate whether and
how a vulnerability, if any, can be exploited. For instance, from the analysis
presented in [41, 42] it is not clear how a chosen plaintext challenge as presented
here can be won, i.e., whether there is a vulnerability at all.
3.2 Dictionary attacks and time versus memory trade-offs
There exist methods to efficiently pre-calculate dictionaries with stored cipher-
text/key pairs to amortize the cost of encryptions over many different key at-
tacks [19, 28]. To evaluate their threat, it is necessary to estimate the resources
needed to construct and operate such a dictionary. Constructing a table of
Rainbow chains or a dictionary of encryptions is equivalent to doing a brute
force key search and requires the same effort [19, 28]. The new question is how
much resources are needed to use the dictionary after it has been created.
For simplicity, assume a key size of k and an ordered (Ciphertexti,Keyi)
dictionary with L = 2k−ǫ encryptions of a 3k long plaintext X0 as in [19]. The
factor ǫ determines the fraction of keys in the dictionary as 2−ǫ. With these
numbers, the size of the dictionary is D = 4kL. According to [19] it takes at
most 3k(k − ǫ) comparisons to find an encryption in the dictionary, but k − ǫ
comparisons seems a more conservative choice. For k = 56 and ǫ = 6, the size
of the dictionary is D = 4 · 56 · 250 ≈ 2.5 · 1017 bits, or 3.1 · 1016 bytes, and the
expected number of comparisons per lookup becomes 50.
In the ideal case, every comparison is done in, say, two steps for a total of
100 steps per lookup. Assume that Attackers “lease” access to the dictionary for
each look-up, that is, there are no “wait states” and the resource is in constant
use by Attackers. The average cost of a lookup is then 3.1 · 1018 bytes, ignoring
the small costs of the comparisons themselves. The average cost of a discovered
key would be around 2 ·1020 bytes. Compared to the current scope of hardware,
at 1018 byte/s for a single desktop system [39], this cost is unremarkable.
The real point is not the “computation” or processing, but the required
storage capacity of 31 petabyte (31 · 1015). This is around 15% of the capacity
of a large data-center like Google’s Googleplex facility, or a “botnet” of a few
million computers with some 10 GB each. Such a resource would require parallel
access through many nodes, which would change the simple cost model above. A
botnet of this size would have to contain some 3 million compromised computers
with a real cost in the order of $15 a piece, in 2007 dollars, on the black market,
or $45 million in total [29]. The combined value of the encoded information
must outweigh the costs of this set up to make this attack worthwhile. The
computational capacity of such a distributed data center or botnet, with it’s
delayed response times, is obviously different from an integrated desktop system.
This analysis shows that using such a dictionary is, unsurprisingly, not so
much a computational as a storage problem. In this case, the maintenance
of such a large storage is much more a limitation than the duration of the
computation.
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3.3 Pseudo Random Number Generator attacks: The TF-
1 generator
Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) are important cryptographic
primitives that can be vulnerable to their own types of attacks [17]. PRNGs are
used, for example, to generate the symmetric keys in public key communication
protocols like SSL (Secure Socket Layer protocol). Their relative security, or
lack thereof, is strongly determined by the resources available to the Attacker
(e.g., [17]).
The Klimov-Shamir number generator TF-1 is analyzed by Tsaban [34]. In
short, for a word size w, this PRNG has an internal state of size 4w. The
intended “strength” is 22w [18, 34], i.e., 2w bit. However, Tsaban finds that
the internal state can be found in 16 · 21.5w elementary operations (i.e., 1.5w
bit strength) after scanning 2w output words for a 0 value [34]. Each possible
internal state can, on average, be checked in 16 basic operations given a special
0 value in the output.
The 16 operations needed to check the internal state are very basic. A DES
Cracker like search unit should be sufficient (see section 2.3.1). The original
DES Cracker search unit used around 120 byte per bit key width. For the sake
of argument, it is assumed here that a comparable setup could be constructed
that analyzes the internal state again of the TF-1 number generator for 120 byte
per bit in the reduced word size 1.5w. Each basic operation should again need
only a single clock cycle. For such a system, the above analysis for the single
DES cracker would still hold up to a fixed factor (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).
An efficient setup with the complexity and speed of a ATI HD Radeon 5870
(see section 2.3.2 and table 1) would need under half a second to find the internal
state for a word width of w = 32 bit (48 bit strength) and less than five months
for a word width of w = 48 bit (72 bit strength), both on average (see table 3).
A cluster using 65 thousand such set-ups could finish a w = 56 bit word length
in ten days (84 bit strength). A theoretical w = 60 bit word length variant
(90 bit strength) could be expected to be broken in less than two years. For
word lengths of w = 64 (96 bit strength), the time still runs into 120 years and
remains elusive as Tsaban already notes [34].
The number of output words needed to find a 0 word can become unwieldy
for the longer, w = {48, 56}, word lengths (see table 3). For w = 48, around
248−1 ≈ 1014 output words have to be scanned for a 0 value. That is around 40
hours at a billion (109) words per second (average). For w = 56 this would be a
waiting time of 14 months. Note that originally, the intended strengths of word
lengths of 32, 48, and 56 bit in TF-1 were, respectively, 64, 96, and 112 bit.
An efficient attack of the TF-1 number generator would be to set up a cheap
system to scan for 0-words storing a history of PRNG output and relevant data
to compromise. Only after a 0-word has been encountered, the machinery to
attack the cypher would be commissioned and the attack performed.
No one has yet reported a DES Cracker like set-up for TF-1. So the above
calculations are based on the assumption that it could be possible to harness the
design complexity of a modern GPU for custom designed cryptanalysis hard-
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ware.
The above analysis allows to put a monetary number on the price to crack
this specific PRNG. Users of this algorithm can now judge themselves how much
any adversaries would be willing to pay for such a set-up and what the chances
are of a version of the algorithm that does not need to find a 0 word.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Cryptanalysis promises to be a very fertile field for developing insight into the
quantification of computational resource needs. A game theoretic view of crypt-
analysis was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern and later taken up
by Shannon [40, 31]. This study adopts this game approach and proposes to
use computability logic [15, 16, 39] to rigorously define Shannon’s work function
[31]. In this approach, attack procedures are formulated in terms of computable
functions [36], the resources used, and also a full definition of the context of the
attack.
Based on a few “natural” requirements, a simple formula for quantified re-
sources emerges as equation 1 with the features of Memory times Steps, i.e.,
a dimension of bytes [39]. This count includes the information “frozen” into
the computational device itself, e.g., the UTM action table or the components
and connections of the CPU. By reducing silicon CPU complexity to transistor
connectivity and memory capacity, it is possible to roughly guess the capacity
of real hardware.
Using the estimated hardware complexity of mass market processors as an
upper boundary, it is possible to estimate the limits of customized cryptanalytic
hardware. These limits can be used to understand historical cases, like the fail-
ure of 56 bit DES encryptions [6]. These limits can also be used to predict the
(theoretical) failure of modern cryptographic primitives like the TF-1 PRNG
with a theoretical strength of 84 and 90 bit keys (intended strengths were origi-
nally 112 and 120 bits) [18, 34] as well as the efforts needed to actually effectuate
Table 3: Expected times for finding the internal state of a TF-1 PRNG [34]
using theoretically optimal custom CPUs with the complexity of an ATI HD
Radeon 5870 (1.83 · 1018 Byte/s). See text for details.
#CPU : number of CPU equivalents; #values : number of PRNG values needed
to find special 0 value; time: expected time to find the internal state after
finding the special 0 value.
w strength (bit) #CPU #values time
32 48 1 2.1 · 109 0.5 sec
48 72 1 1.4 · 1014 4.2 months
56 84 65,536 3.6 · 1016 9.4 days
60 90 65,536 5.8 · 1017 1.8 year
64 96 65,536 9.2 · 1018 120 years
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the attacks.
It can be concluded that the general problem of quantifying computational
resource use in interactive cryptanalysis attacks can be solved in a formalized
setting. When used to formalize cryptanalysis, it becomes possible to quantify
the cryptanalysis work function [31]. Even the computational costs of hypo-
thetical attacks on cryptographic primitives can be estimated before they have
to be demonstrated at great monetary cost.
Examples show that it would currently (2010) be feasible to build hardware
that could break some 84 bit strength cryptographic primitives in mere days,
and 90 bit strength primitives in less than two years.
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